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ABSTRACT. Policy instruments can help put climate adaptation plans into action. Here, we propose a method for the systematic
assessment and selection of policy instruments for stimulating adaptation action. The multi-disciplinary set of six assessment criteria
is derived from economics, policy, and legal studies. These criteria are specified for the purpose of climate adaptation by taking into
account four challenges to the governance of climate adaptation: uncertainty, spatial diversity, controversy, and social complexity. The
six criteria and four challenges are integrated into a step-wise method that enables the selection of instruments starting from a generic
assessment and ending with a specific assessment of policy instrument mixes for the stimulation of a specific adaptation measure. We
then apply the method to three examples of adaptation measures. The method’s merits lie in enabling deliberate choices through a
holistic and comprehensive set of adaptation specific criteria, as well as deliberative choices by offering a stepwise method that structures
an informed dialog on instrument selection. Although the method was created and applied by scientific experts, policy-makers can also
use the method.
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INTRODUCTION
Although, in the past decade, efforts to plan for climate adaptation
have increased, in particular, in developed countries (Biesbroek
et al. 2010, Preston et al. 2011), their translation into actual
adaptation practice is still scarce and constrained by multiple
barriers (Biesbroek et al. 2010, Archie et al. 2012, Bierbaum et al.
2013). Although the climate adaptation debate nowadays includes
the “how to adapt” question (Wilby and Vaughan 2011:271), so
far, the literature offers little insight into how adaptation plans
are put into practice, and by whom (Dovers and Hezri 2010,
Berrang-Ford et al. 2011). Given their collective nature,
adaptation plans often appear to be initiated and developed by
governments at various levels (Johnson and Priest 2008, Berrang-
Ford et al. 2011, Mees and Driessen 2011, Runhaar et al. 2012).
Governments can make a conscious choice about allocations of
responsibilities for adaptation; they can decide to transfer certain
responsibilities for adaptation action to private actors such as
citizens, civil organizations, and businesses (Mees et al. 2012).
They can also incentivize private adaptation action through policy
instruments (Berkhout 2005, Fankhauser et al. 2008, Wilby and
Vaughan 2011). However, which instruments are suitable for
climate adaptation purposes, and which criteria are important for
the selection of those instruments? The how and by whom
questions are interrelated and address the topic of governance
modes and available instruments for climate adaptation (D.
Huitema et al. unpublished manuscript). 
The selection of policy instruments is a classic dilemma for policy-
makers and a recurrent research topic in policy studies (e.g.,
Howlett 1991, Glasbergen 1992, Bemelmans-Videc et al. 1998,
Gunningham and Grabosky 1998). So far, there is limited insight
into which policy instruments are available for promoting
adaptation to climate change and how they perform against
criteria such as effectiveness and legitimacy. Insights from other
policy domains are not easily transferable; the literature suggests
that the performance of policy instruments is heavily influenced
by the specific problem characteristics (Hellegers and Van Ierland
2003). 
We argue that certain specific characteristics of climate
adaptation offer challenges to its governance, and these should
be taken into account when selecting policy instruments for
climate adaptation. These challenges are uncertainty, spatial
diversity, controversy, and social complexity (Termeer et al. 2011,
Mees et al. 2012, van Buuren et al. 2014). Uncertainty relates to
the climate system itself, its effects on society, and the costs,
benefits, and effectiveness of adaptation measures (e.g., Füssel
2007, Adger et al. 2009, Van Vuuren et al. 2011). The long-term
character of climate change and, consequently, the long-term
planning horizon it requires clashes with short-term policy and
political cycles and hence exacerbates this uncertainty (e.g.,
Fankhauser et al. 1999, Dovers and Hezri 2010). Spatial diversity
of climate impacts occurs between and within regions, city
districts, and socioeconomic groups in society, leading to
differential vulnerabilities and inequalities (Lindley et al. 2007,
Aaheim et al. 2010). Controversy refers to contradictory
perceptions of adaptation problems, goals, and measures (Adger
et al. 2009, Hinkel et al. 2010). Social complexity refers to the
multi-level, multi-sector, and multi-actor character of adaptation
action, leading to unclear and fragmented responsibilities and
institutional voids (e.g., Urwin and Jordan 2008, Termeer et al.
2011, Mees et al. 2012). We argue that these challenges give
direction to the objectives that policy instruments should fulfil,
and they should therefore influence criteria for the selection of
policy instruments. For example, the uptake of green roofs by
private actors for the retention of heavy rainfall is hampered by
the uncertainties regarding the costs and benefits of green roofs.
Effectiveness, i.e., achieving sufficient levels of adaptation action
to achieve a critical mass of green roofs for rainfall retention, will
be an important criterion for governments to stimulate the uptake
of green roofs by private actors. Hence, governments might decide
to employ a technical requirement for green roofs through a
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building code as the key policy instrument to secure sufficient
adaptation action (Mees et al. 2013). 
Here, a team of experts from legal, policy, and economic studies
develops and applies an ex-ante method for the systematic
selection of policy instruments for climate adaptation action,
taking into account the particular governance challenges of
climate adaptation. This work fills a gap in climate adaptation
governance literature by contributing to the question of how
adaptation can be put into practice. The method may also support
public policy-makers in systematically assessing and selecting
policy instruments for climate adaptation and justifying their
choices. Furthermore, the method allows for the design of policy
instrument mixes, a topic that has not yet been elaborated upon
in much detail in policy studies. Various authors have claimed
that in environmental policy, the employment of a mix of policy
instruments is often preferable for reaching multiple policy
objectives and target groups because policy instruments may
complement each other and compensate each other’s weaknesses
(see Taylor et al. 2012). Conceptualizations and empirical
evidence, however, are limited (Glasbergen 1992, Oikonomou and
Jepma 2008, Weber et al. 2014). In part, this is explained by the
inherent nature of the identification of appropriate policy
instrument mixes: It strongly depends on what criteria are
considered most important in a particular adaptation context,
what weights are put on those criteria (e.g., in the case of uneven
distribution of vulnerabilities, fairness may be the most important
criterion), and the extent to which compensation between criteria
is considered feasible or desirable. 
Specifically, we address the following two questions: How can
criteria for the selection of policy instruments for climate
adaptation be specified according to the challenges to the
governance of climate adaptation? How can policy instrument
mixes be selected systematically based on these criteria? By means
of an expert judgment applied to three examples of urban
adaptation measures, we demonstrate the usefulness of the
method. We first present a framework for the assessment of policy
instruments, followed by an explanation of the method. We then
describe three examples of urban adaptation measures (green
roofs, flood-resilient building, and behavioral measures to
extreme heat), illustrate the method through its application to
these examples, and discuss the results of our exercise. We end
with conclusions and some reflections.
ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
Policy instruments: a typology
Policy instruments are “effecting tools”, which are meant to have
an effect on behavior (Hood 2007:139). They are often referred
to as the “tools of government” (Hood 1983). We use the following
definition of a policy instrument: “a deliberate structured effort
by governors to solve a policy problem by modifying actions of
the governed” (Brukas and Sallnäs 2012:605). We take the
perspective of local urban policy-makers as the governors who
can employ policy instruments to stimulate adaptation action, or
alternatively, use the market by stimulating private actors to
employ policy instruments to regulate the market (Fankhauser et
al. 2008) or use the governance network (Vabo and Røiseland
2012). This government-led perspective is distinct from more
autonomously-led adaptation by organizations, which have their
own drivers for taking action (e.g., Berkhout et al. 2006, Wilby
and Vaughan 2011, Berkhout 2012), or by individuals (e.g.,
Tompkins and Eakin 2012, Wamsler and Brink 2014). To identify
systematically the variety of policy instruments for adaptation,
we use a two-dimensional classification scheme that includes the
following. 
. The type of governance arrangement: We distinguish between
hierarchical public arrangements with governments as the
main governing actors; interactive arrangements in which
governments and private actors jointly govern; and market
governance in which the initiative to implement adaptation
measures is left to private actors (e.g., companies or
homeowners) and civil society. These three arrangements
are generally identified in the governance literature, albeit
sometimes under different headings (Thompson et al. 1991,
Gunningham and Sinclair 2002, Kjær 2004, Driessen et al.
2012). 
. The associated policy instruments and their underlying
rationales: In the literature, three types of policy instruments
are usually distinguished: legal (or regulatory) instruments,
economic instruments, and communicative (or informational)
instruments (Hood 1983, Glasbergen 1992, Vedung 1998,
Gunningham and Sinclair 2002, Brukas and Sallnäs 2012).
Each type is based on a different rationale regarding the way
actors are steered: by restricting or allowing behavioral
options (legal instruments), by changing the cost-to-benefit
ratios of these options (economic instruments), or by
informing about options (communication instruments). 
We classify policy instruments for adaptation according to these
two dimensions (Table 1). Most instruments can potentially be
employed in any type of governance arrangement, although
regulatory instruments tend to dominate with hierarchical
arrangements, and economic instruments with market
arrangements. In the category of legal instruments, for instance,
one could introduce a building requirement for houses in flood-
prone areas (Aerts and Botzen 2011) or mandatory labels that
specify the vulnerability of a house to floods. Economic
instruments for adaptation could, for instance, comprise
insurance fee discounts if  property owners invest in measures that
reduce flood risks, such as green roofs (see Kleindorfer and
Kunreuther 1999, Kunreuther and Pauly 2006). A typical
communication instrument is the public information campaign,
for example, advice from municipal health services on how to
avoid heat stress, a phenomenon that is expected to increase in
frequency as a consequence of climate change (Runhaar et al.
2012). Our list of instruments is not exhaustive and is necessarily
incomplete (Table 1). We only include those instruments that are
typically used to address environmental problems (see Glasbergen
1992, Vedung 1998, Hellegers and Van Ierland 2003, Wurzel et
al. 2003, Taylor et al. 2012, Lockie 2013), which are therefore
potential candidates for climate adaptation policies. This does not
mean that all listed instruments are equally suitable in the context
of specific adaptation measures, as we show in the adaptation
examples.
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Table 1. A list of promising policy instruments for promoting adaptation to climate change.
Type of instrument Hierarchical (public) governance Interactive governance Market (private) governance
Legal instruments - Technical requirements, including
quota, zoning, relocation, and
prescription of best available technology
or best practices (TR)
- Contractual agreements or covenants
(CA)
- Private labeling, including
investor requirements (PL)
- Performance standards (PS)
- Mandatory labeling (ML)
Economic instruments - Subsidies, including reduction of fees
(SU)
- Smart subsidies or auctions (SSU) - Insurances fee differentiation
(INS)
- Taxes (TAX) - Tradable permits (TP)
Communicative
instruments
- Public information campaigns (PI) - Product information (PI)
Criteria for policy instrument selection
A variety of performance criteria might apply for climate
adaptation. We use a multi-disciplinary set of most commonly
applied assessment criteria for policy analysis as derived from
economics, policy, and legal studies: effectiveness, efficiency,
legitimacy, accountability, legal certainty, and fairness (e.g.,
Nelissen 2002, Crabbé and Leroy 2008). This set is also inspired
by the “thick analysis framework”, as employed by Adger et al.
(2003), which is meant to foster interdisciplinarity and pluralism
to overcome a narrow approach in environmental research. We
next define the six criteria and explicitly link them to the four
challenges of uncertainty, spatial diversity, controversy, and social
complexity. 
From economics, we derived the criteria of effectiveness and
efficiency. Effectiveness is commonly understood as the extent to
which policy goals are achieved by means of the selected policy
instruments and the available resources; in the case of climate
adaptation, it is about securing sufficient adaptation action.
Effectiveness is influenced by uncertainty, in the sense that high
uncertainties regarding the spatial and temporal impacts of
climate change could deter people from taking adaptation action,
resulting in non- or under-adaptation (Adger et al. 2009, Gifford
2011). In such circumstances, policy instruments are called for
that steer or even force people to adapt, to reach sufficient levels
of adaptation action. 
Efficiency is about the optimum allocation of scarce resources,
ensuring that an adaptation good is provided at the lowest cost.
Efficiency is also affected by uncertainty, but in the opposite
direction: governments might take too much action too soon out
of precaution, resulting in costly over-adaptation (Driessen and
Van Rijswick 2011). In such cases, policy instruments are needed
that promote experimentation and flexible adaptation action that
can be adjusted easily over time and in light of the long-term
planning horizon needed for adaptation (Fankhauser et al. 1999,
Huitema et al. 2009, Gupta et al. 2010, Keessen and Van Rijswick
2012). Furthermore, efficiency is influenced by spatial diversity
in the sense that each specific location or region might be affected
in different ways. In such situations, policy instruments are needed
that promote adaptation action tailored to each specific location
to minimize costs. 
From policy studies, we derived the criteria of legitimacy and
accountability. Legitimacy, from a policy and legal-scientific
point of view, is about the acceptance of authority and
justification of power (Bernstein 2005, Bekkers and Edwards
2007, Dingwerth 2007). Controversies around the problems,
goals, and measures of adaptation affect the criterion of output
legitimacy, i.e., the perceived effectiveness among stakeholders
(Biermann and Gupta 2011), often operationalized as the
acceptance of the outcomes of a governance process (Bekkers
and Edwards 2007). This is because the different value systems
and interests of actors might make a high acceptance level of
adaptation measures among stakeholders problematic. If  this is
the case, policy instruments must be selected based on their ability
to stimulate acceptance of their effects by all relevant stakeholder
groups that are faced with the adaptation problem at stake.
Furthermore, social complexities affect the criterion of input
legitimacy, i.e., inclusion of all interests at stake (Bekkers and
Edwards 2007, Few et al. 2007, Paavola 2008). In cases of high
social complexity, policy instruments must be selected based on
their ability to serve all relevant interests without excluding
affected parties (Paavola 2008). 
Accountability is about stakeholders and society being able to
scrutinize the actions of policy-makers. This can be achieved
through, for instance, clarity of responsibilities (Botchway 2001)
and transparency of information on the content and process of
policy-making (Gupta 2010). Again, a large extent of social
complexity leads to fragmented and ambiguous responsibilities
for adaptation (Urwin and Jordan 2008). Hence, policy
instruments are needed that support a clear allocation and
transparency of responsibilities for adaptation action. 
From legal studies, we derived the criteria of legal certainty and
fairness. Legal certainty means that the law must provide those
subject to it with the ability to regulate their conduct. Legal
certainty is internationally recognized as a central requirement
for the rule of law and as a grounding value for the legality of
legislative and administrative measures taken by public
authorities (Fuller 1969, Radbruch 1970, Popelier 2000). In case
of high uncertainty regarding the spatial and temporal effects of
climate impacts, people need to know where they stand in terms
of regulation so that they can align their adaptation action in
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Table 2. Adaptation-specific performance criteria for the selection of policy instruments.
Governance
challenge
Criteria at risk Explanation Performance criteria for the selection of
policy instruments for climate
adaptation
Uncertainty Effectiveness; securing
(adaptation) goals
Uncertainties regarding climate impacts as well as the
costs, benefits, and effectiveness of adaptation
measures deter people from taking action, resulting in
non- or underadaptation
Steers toward supplying sufficient levels
of adaptation goods/services (the more
coercive, the more steering power)
Fairness; reasonable distribution
of burdens intra- and
intergenerationally
Uncertainties regarding the spatial and temporal
effects of climate change mean that the precautionary
principle should be applied to ensure that sufficient
action is taken to guarantee a minimum safety level for
everyone in society, spatially and temporally
Steers toward supplying sufficient levels
of adaptation goods/services for
everyone now and in the future
Legal certainty; the law must
provide those subject to it with
the ability to regulate their
conduct
Because of uncertainties regarding spatial and
temporal effects of climate change and its impacts on
society, people need to know where they stand in terms
of regulations for a considerable period of time so that
they can fine-tune their adaptation actions in
accordance with these regulations
Offers legal certainty through clear,
understandable, and stable rules to
which people can conform
Efficiency; supply of flexible
adaptation goods to achieve
lowest cost
Uncertainties regarding climate impacts could entice
(governments to take) actions that are overdone and
costly, resulting in over-adaptation
Promotes flexible adaptation solutions
and measures that can be easily adjusted
over time to minimize costs
Spatial
diversity
Fairness; reasonable distribution
of burdens according to carrying
capacity
The spatial diversity of climate impacts leads to
differential vulnerabilities owing to diversities in
exposure to climate impacts, sensitivity to those
impacts, and capacity to adapt among people, districts,
regions, etc.
Steers toward supplying sufficient levels
of adaptation goods to hotspots most
vulnerable to climate impacts while
recovering a fair share of the costs of
adaptation action from those who
benefit
Efficiency; supply of spatially
tailored adaptation goods to
achieve lowest cost
The spatial diversity of climate impacts means that
each specific location, region, building, etc. is affected
differently and might need different responses
Promotes diverse adaptation action that
is tailored to a specific location to
minimize costs
Controversy Output legitimacy; support of
stakeholders for an adaptation
goal, solution, and the decision
process
Controversies around adaptation goals and solutions
reflect different interests, principles, and value systems
among actors, resulting in problematic support for
adaptation policies
Stimulates acceptance of its effects on all
relevant stakeholders
Social
complexity
Input legitimacy; inclusion of all
relevant interests
Social complexities mean that various target groups,
sectors, and levels are affected by climate impacts, so
these should be consciously considered in the policy
Serves all relevant interests that are
influenced by the policy without
excluding actors or groups that have
something at stake
Accountability; reciprocal clarity
and transparency of governors
and the governed
Social complexities lead to the fragmentation and
ambiguity of responsibilities, hampering clear
accountability structures
Supports the allocation and
transparency of responsibilities for
adaptation action for both the governors
and the governed
accordance with these regulations. Therefore, policy instruments
must be selected for their ability to offer legal certainty through
stable and understandable rules. 
Fairness is interpreted here as distributive fairness, i.e., the fair
allocation of burdens and benefits for climate adaptation action.
Adaptation is claimed to particularly raise the issue of fair benefit
sharing, i.e., the distribution of scarce adaptation resources
among recipients of benefits. This is because adaptation action
generates local goods for specific targets rather than global
common goods, as is the case with mitigation (e.g., Paavola and
Adger 2006, Grasso 2007, Jagers and Duus-Otterström 2008,
Driessen and Van Rijswick 2011). Fairness is influenced by two
governance challenges. Uncertainty regarding the spatial and
temporal effects of climate change activates the precautionary
principle so that inter- and intra-generational equity is
considered. In such a situation, policy instruments are needed
that steer toward supplying sufficient levels of adaptation goods
for everybody in society. The second challenge, the spatial
diversity of climate impacts, means that some groups and regions
are more vulnerable than others. In such cases, policy instruments
must help to prioritize the supply of sufficient levels of adaptation
action to specific vulnerable hotspots by putting the most
vulnerable first (Paavola and Adger 2006, Grasso 2007). In doing
so, policy instruments can also try to recover the cost of
adaptation action from those who profit from that action
(Atkinson et al. 2000, Driessen and Van Rijswick 2011). 
From these criteria and challenges, we derived nine specific
adaptation criteria (Table 2). We use these nine criteria to assess
the performance of the identified policy instruments (Table 1).
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METHOD
Step-wise approach
As a team of scientific experts, we created a method comprising
a step-wise approach for the purpose of policy instruments
selection. The method starts from the point that a suitable
adaptation measure has been selected based on the adaptation
issue and goal at hand, for instance, through a multi-criteria
analysis applied to various adaptation options (e.g., de Bruin et
al. 2009). Clearly, the selection of adaptation measures would
equally benefit from a deliberate rather than a routine approach
based on past experience (Tennekes et al. 2014), but that is beyond
the scope of this paper. Our method is designed to select policy
instruments for predefined adaptation measures and comprises
four steps: 
1. General assessment of policy instruments: The purpose of
this step is to identfy an appropriate set of policy instruments
for climate adaptation in general. This can be done by
assessing the promising policy instruments we identified
previously (Table 1) using the nine performance criteria
(Table 2). For the sake of simplicity, we propose using a
three-point ordinal scale whereby each instrument receives
a high, medium, or low score on each criterion. 
2. Specific assessment of policy instruments for a certain
adaptation measure: To calibrate the results, a sensitivity
check is performed on the suitability and scores of policy
instruments from Step 1 for a specific adaptation measure. 
3. Assessment of the four governance challenges for a certain
adaptation measure: The purpose of this step is to identify
the relative importance of the performance criteria for a
specific adaptation measure. This can be done by scoring
the extent to which the four challenges manifest themselves
for that specific adaptation measure, using the same three-
point scale of high, medium, and low. 
4. Specific selection of appropriate policy instruments for a
certain adaptation measure: The purpose of this final step is
to identify appropriate combinations of instruments per
adaptation measure. This can be done by checking which
instruments perform best on the most relevant performance
criteria (combining steps 1 and 3). Next, one can look for
combinations of instruments that score well on different
relevant criteria, thus complementing each other and/or
compensating for each other’s weaknesses, and/or by
combining instruments that cover different target groups,
and/or by sequentially introducing different instruments. 
The four adaptation challenges play an important role in the
method. First, they shape the formulation of criteria for the
selection of instruments for adaptation in general (Step 1).
Second, they determine the weight of the criteria for each specific
adaptation measure (Step 3).
Explicating the method
The method is designed to accommodate an interactive and
deliberative process. The idea is that the steps are completed as a
joint exercise by a multi-disciplinary team of experts and/or
policy-makers. The underlying assumption of the method is that
potential biases can be minimized by using a holistic set of six
assessment criteria comprising different rationales for policy-
making and by using the collective knowledge, perspectives,
values, and interests of a multi-disciplinary team. For an
illustration, we performed this exercise as a multi-disciplinary
team of six experts from economics, policy, and legal studies.
Initially, the assessments in steps 1 and 3 were done individually
by each expert. During two intense, interactive workshops, we
exchanged argumentations for these individual assessments,
occasionally had discussions, reached agreement on certain
scores, and validated the ultimate scores by combining and/or
contrasting the argumentations. Hence, the scores are based on a
common judgment and interpretation of the team and represent
indications of the suitability of an instrument relative to the other
instruments rather than absolute scores. We found a three-point
scale to be sufficiently differentiating without giving a false sense
of accuracy; more refined scales increase the complexity of the
method without making it necessarily more robust. We argue that
the robustness of the method lies in the use of multiple criteria
by experts of multiple disciplinary backgrounds as well as the
deliberation on the argumentation of scores.
ADAPTATION MEASURES USED FOR THE
ILLUSTRATION
We opted for three adaptation measures that are employed by the
public authorities of Rotterdam, a frontrunner in adaptation
planning (Mees and Driessen 2011): (1) green roofs for
stormwater retention, (2) flood resilient building for water safety,
and (3) behavioral adaptation to extreme heat. All three examples
represent urban adaptation measures. While the examples were
selected primarily for practical reasons (the team has relevant
know-how and experience with these examples from previous
empirical work), they have the fringe benefit that they represent
privately provided goods that serve public adaptation goals (see
Tompkins and Eakin 2012) as well as private goals. This makes
them particularly relevant for our research because local
governors need the private sector (citizens and organizations) to
attain the aspired public adaptation good; therefore, governors
have a motive to incentivize the private sector to implement these
measures through policy instruments. 
The three examples purposely differ in the type of adaptation
issue they address, assuming that this will lead to differences in
the extent to which the four adaptation challenges manifest
themselves across the examples. The examples are illustrative of
the application of our method for the selection of instrument
mixes and are not meant to be representative of the performance
of policy instruments for climate adaptation. This would be
impossible anyway because climate adaptation encompasses a
wide variety of risks from climate change, as well as a wide variety
of possible measures (Runhaar et al. 2012). We briefly describe
the three adaptation measures before sharing the results obtained
through the application of the method by the expert group. 
Green roofs are roofs with vegetation. They help to store excessive
rainfall and also reduce excessive heat build-up in houses. Green
roofs are often promoted as “no-regrets” adaptation measures:
even if  their effects on climate adaptation are uncertain or
unknown, they have co-benefits for property owners and society
at large. Nevertheless, autonomous installations by private actors
have not yet occurred widely. Green roofs are generally not
considered by private actors because of an imbalance between
high short-term installation costs and the slow reaping of benefits
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Table 3. General assessment of 11 policy instruments. See Table 1 for policy instruments and Table 2 for performance criteria.
Policy instrument
Challenge Criterion Indicator to assess a policy instrument TR PS ML SU TAX PI CA SSU TP PLB INS
Uncertainty Effectiveness Steers toward supplying sufficient levels of adaptation
goods/services (the more coercive, the more steering
power)
H† M L L M L M L H L M
Fairness Steers toward supplying sufficient levels of adaptation
goods/services for everyone now and in the future
M M L L M L L L M L L
Legal
certainty
Offers legal certainty through clear, understandable,
and stable rules to which people can conform
H H M M H L M M H M M
Efficiency Promotes flexible adaptation solutions and measures
that can be adjusted easily over time to minimize costs
L H M M M H M H H H H
Spatial
diversity
Fairness Steers toward supplying sufficient levels of adaptation
goods to hotspots most vulnerable to climate impacts
while recovering a fair share of the costs of adaptation
action from those who benefit
H M M M H M H H H L L
Efficiency Promotes diverse adaptation action that is tailored to a
specific location to minimize costs
L M L L L H H H H L M
Controversy Legitimacy Stimulates acceptance of its impacts by all relevant
stakeholders
M M M M L H M M M M M
Social
complexity
Legitimacy Serves all relevant interests that are influenced by the
policy without excluding actors or groups that have
something at stake
L L L L L M M L L L L
Accountab­
ility
Supports the allocation and transparency of
responsibilities for adaptation action for both the
governors and the governed
H M L H H L H H H L H
 Note: The individual assessments for the full set of instruments are documented in a report that is available online: http://
knowledgeforclimate.climateresearchnetherlands.nl/.
†Performance criteria were assessed using a qualitative score: H = high, M = medium, L = low. 
over time, among other reasons. If  installation is left to private
actors, adaptation action is likely to be insufficient and
fragmented (Mees et al. 2013). Moreover, adaptation action will
probably not occur in those parts of the city most prone to surface
water flooding or heat stress. Consequently, policy-makers have
started to employ a wide range of policy instruments to promote
the uptake of green roofs (Carter and Fowler 2008), of which
economic instruments are most commonly applied (Mees et al.
2013). 
Flood-resilient building measures are measures applied to new
and existing houses and other buildings that reduce the impact of
a flood, i.e., prevent flood damage from occurring. These
measures are an alternative to flood walls and elevated buildings
and are often applied in unembanked areas. They are also referred
to as the wet-proofing or dry-proofing of buildings. In the former
case, water is allowed to enter the building, and the finishing of
floors and walls is adapted to withstand water. In the latter case,
the building itself  provides watertight protection for itself  and its
surroundings. The application of flood-resilient building
measures depends very much on the specifics of the location and
its vulnerability to flooding. A common way to ensure the
implementation of these types of measures is via legal instruments
of spatial planning such as master plans and building codes, or
to specify them as technical requirements through contractual
agreements (Mees et al. 2014). 
Behavioral measures to adapt to extreme heat range from drinking
more water and refraining from heavy exercise to ventilating
rooms, seeking cooler places, and closing window shutters. These
types of measures are meant to keep the body temperature under
a certain level to prevent heat stress, morbidity, and even mortality,
particularly among vulnerable population groups such as the
elderly and chronically ill (Schär and Jendritzky 2004). Behavioral
measures to combat extreme heat are generally advised through
heat health early warning systems and response plans (Lowe et
al. 2011). A key governance issue lies in the fragmentation of
responsibilities among the multiple public and private actors
involved (World Health Organization 2007), ranging from officers
of public health and social services to health practitioners,
caretakers in residential homes, and citizens or their family and
neighbors. A commonly applied instrument is the public health
information campaign (World Health Organization 2007).
APPLYING THE METHOD: AN ILLUSTRATION
Step 1: general assessment of policy instruments
We assessed all policy instruments (Table 1) on the nine criteria
(Table 2), resulting in scores for all policy instruments (Table 3).
Here, we give an example of the argumentation behind these
scores. A technical requirement, for instance one that prescribes
green roofs for new developments with flat roofs, scores high on
effectiveness (Table 3). The argumentation for this score is that a
technical requirement offers a high certainty that the adaptation
goal is reached through its coercive nature, as long as its
application can be monitored and enforced. By contrast, a smart
subsidy scores low on effectiveness. Consider, for instance, a
subsidy for green roofs that is allocated through an auction
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mechanism that ensures that only the low-cost actors are selected
to adapt (see Ferraro 2008). A smart subsidy is a voluntary
instrument: actors can decide not to participate, and, in the case
that an auction is used, only the low-cost adapters will receive a
subsidy. Hence, a smart subsidy is expected to offer too little of
that adaptation measure. 
On the other hand, a technical requirement scores low on the two
efficiency criteria, whereas a smart subsidy scores high on these
efficiency criteria. A technical requirement is a one-size-fits-all
instrument that does not select the least-cost suppliers and does
not offer any flexibility for adjustment over time or for tailor-
made adaptation action (unless it is formulated by way of
describing several allowed best practices). By contrast, a smart
subsidy instrument allows for the selection of the least-cost actors
to implement the adaptation measure. Furthermore, it offers
flexibility over time because a smart subsidy is only introduced
as and when adaptation action is needed and can be applied for
a certain specific vulnerable region only. An example of the scores
and argumentations for one instrument, the technical
requirement, is provided in Appendix 1.
Step 2: specific assessment of policy instruments for a certain
adaptation measure
By conducting a sensitivity check, we discovered that certain
instruments were less suitable for the three adaptation measures
than others. Taxes were disregarded because they are intended to
discourage harmful behavior rather than to encourage good
behavior such as the implementation of adaptation measures. It
is, for instance, difficult to imagine taxing an individual for not
wanting to install a green roof. Similarly, tradable permits seem
less appropriate for these adaptation measures because they are
also meant to discourage harmful behavior by putting a price on
carbon emissions or the use of scarce resources. These two
instruments were therefore disregarded in steps 3 and 4 for the
three adaptation measures in our study, but they may be useful
for other adaptation policies that, for instance, intend to limit the
use of fresh water in case of scarcity. Furthermore, we fine-tuned
the scores of the policy instruments for the criterion of
accountability based on the characteristics of one of the
adaptation measures (Table 3). Measures for behavioral
adaptation to extreme heat are rather difficult to trace and
monitor in practice compared to the other two types of measures,
resulting in lower accountability. For instance, how would one
monitor whether people drink sufficient water? For behavioral
adaptation to extreme heat, we therefore lowered the scores for
the criterion of accountability by one grade, i.e., from high to
medium for policy instruments with a high score, and from
medium to low for instruments with a medium score.
Step 3: assessment of the four governance challenges for a certain
adaptation measure
In this step, we assessed the extent to which the four adaptation
challenges manifest themselves in the three adaptation measures
(Table 4). It shows that the challenge of uncertainty has the highest
presence in the example of green roofs. This is because there is
uncertainty in many aspects: in terms of the frequency and
intensity of rainfall and the effects this rainfall may have on the
built environment. Furthermore, there is uncertainty about the
amount of rainfall that can be retained by a green roof, as well as
what its private benefits are, some of which are difficult to convert
to monetary values. This causes high uncertainty with respect to
the return on investment of a green roof installation. Uncertainty
for the other two adaptation measures is somewhat lower due to
greater predictability of sea level rise, river discharge levels, and
hot days, and because of the more advanced knowledge of costs
and benefits of these adaptation measures. The challenge of social
complexity is most prevalent in behavioral adaptation to extreme
heat. This is because there are potentially many different actors
and organizations involved, both in the public and in the private
sector, some of which are difficult to steer and monitor (such as
vulnerable people and their social networks). Although different
public and private organizations are involved in green roofs and
flood-resilient building measures, there is more clarity and
traceability. 
Next, based on the assessment of which challenges were most
dominant for each adaptation measure, we identified the most
relevant criteria from the full set of criteria in Table 2. For the
sake of simplicity, we limited the relevant criteria to those related
to challenges with a high score only. Flood-resilient building
measures, for instance, are characterized by high spatial diversity.
This means that two criteria are most important for the selection
of instruments for this type of measure: “steers toward supplying
sufficient levels of adaptation goods to hotspots most vulnerable
to flooding” and “promotes diverse adaptation action that is
tailored to a specific location to minimize costs”. This way, we
discerned a distinct set of relevant criteria for each adaptation
measure (Table 5).
Step 4: specific selection of instruments for an adaptation
measure
Based on the general assessment of policy instruments (Step 1;
Table 3), we were able to identify policy instruments that scored
high on the sets of relevant criteria for each adaptation measure
(Step 3; Table 5). The results achieved by combining these steps
are given in Table 6. In the next sub-sections, we briefly discuss
each adaptation measure in terms of appropriate instrument
mixes.
Green roofs
This measure is characterized by relatively high levels of
uncertainty and spatial diversity. We discerned the six criteria that
are most relevant for the assessment of policy instruments for
green roofs (Table 5) and then searched for policy instruments
that received good scores for these six criteria based on the results
in Table 3. The policy instrument that performs best, having
medium to high scores on all six criteria, is the performance
standard, implying a public governance arrangement with the
local authority as the principal governor. The most important
weakness of this instrument is that it scores low on input
legitimacy, i.e., the criterion of serving all interests that are
influenced by the policy, because it is a universal instrument that
is not designed to cover all relevant interests (Table 6). However,
no other instrument really scores well on that specific criterion.
The most appropriate alternative to the performance standard
would be the contractual agreement, which scores quite well on
the six relevant criteria and also has a medium score for input
legitimacy. One could combine these two instruments by
introducing contractual agreements based on a performance
standard. This would allow those public and private actors that
enter into the contract to adjust the adaptation measure to their
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Table 4. Assessment of the four challenges for each of three adaptation measures.
Adaptation measure Challenge† Score Argumentation
Uncertainty High There is considerable unpredictability in the frequency and intensity of rainfall events and
the timing and severity of impacts in different parts of the built environment; the
effectiveness of green roofs for rainfall retention in specific locations is highly uncertain, as
is their return on investment given their uncertain and often nonmonetizable benefits
Spatial
diversity
High The amount of rainfall can vary spatially; more significantly, the extent of nuisance from
heavy rainfall and the effectiveness of green roofs heavily depends on the specific location,
amount of existing green space, type of building, slope of roof, etc.
Controversy Low No-regret measure with many public and private benefits and no negative externalities for
others
Social
complexity
Medium Number of actors involved is traceable and manageable; there is some complexity given the
split incentive issue between tenant interests and landlord/real estate investor interests
Green roofs for rainfall
retention
Flood-resilient building
measures
Uncertainty Medium There is some knowledge/expectation about sea-level rise and increased river discharge, but
some degree of uncertainty remains; there is a medium level of knowledge regarding the
effectiveness of different adaptation measures
Spatial
diversity
High The amounts of damage and risk differ considerably by location, house, type of measure
taken, etc.
Controversy Low There is much agreement on the need for and specifications of building codes to make
buildings flood resilient, in particular, in case of new developments
Social
complexity
Medium Number of actors involved is traceable and manageable; however, there could be diverging
views on acceptable risk and damage levels
Behavioral adaptation to
extreme heat
Uncertainty Medium Hot days and heat waves can be predicted well in advance; the effectiveness of simple
behavioral measures to avoid or reduce heat stress is well known; such measures generally
involve low cost (little uncertainty regarding return on investment); however, one cannot be
certain of the extent of behavioral adaptation by vulnerable groups
Spatial
diversity
High Build-up of heat indoors and outdoors depends very much on the location, amount of
green space, living environment, quality of housing, etc.; vulnerability to heat stress among
population groups is diverse
Controversy Low No-regret measures; little effort is needed to adapt behavior; no negative externalities for
others
Social
complexity
High The whole health and social network is/could be involved, in particular, in addressing the
problem of vulnerable people; some actors in the social network (family, neighbors) are
difficult to steer and to monitor
 †Uncertainty about climate impacts on society and the effects, costs, and benefits of adaptation measures; Spatial diversity in terms
of differential climate impacts on society; Controversy about adaptation goals and measures; Social complexity in terms of a multi-
sector and multi-actor character of adaptation.
location-specific needs, suggesting an interactive governance
arrangement. A potential weakness of the combination of these
instruments is that they score relatively low on the indicator of
“steers toward supplying sufficient levels of adaptation action”
(Table 6). Finally, a sequential introduction can be designed by
starting with the introduction of contractual agreements based
on performance standards. As and when the green roof
technology becomes well-known and accepted, and its costs drop
(potentially due to economies of scale), a technical requirement
for all new developments can be introduced, which scores well on
the effectiveness criterion of sufficient levels of adaptation action.
This would imply a shift from interactive to public governance
over time.
Flood-resilient building
This type of measure is relatively less complex than green roofs
or behavioral adaptation to extreme heat in the sense that it is
primarily characterized by a high level of spatial diversity. Based
on the two relevant criteria for dealing with spatial diversity,
contractual agreements would seem to be most appropriate, so
that areas specifically prone to flooding are addressed. Another
appropriate instrument would be the use of smart subsidies
directed toward these hotspots. Both instruments are in line with
interactive governance. The downside of these instruments is that
they do not guarantee a sufficient level of adaptation to flooding
for everybody. This could leave some households less protected
than others, which would perhaps be unfair, particularly if  these
households cannot afford the costs of adaptation measures. If
experts and policy-makers find that safety for all is critical, the
alternative would be to introduce a technical requirement for a
specific set of flood-resilient measures through building codes in
specific flood-prone areas. This would entail a public instead of
an interactive arrangement.
Behavioral adaptation to extreme heat
In addition to high spatial diversity, which it has in common with
the other two measures, this type of measure is characterized by
a high level of social complexity. Hence, two additional criteria
are of importance here: “serves all relevant interests that are
influenced by the policy” and “supports the allocation and
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Table 5. Measure-specific relevant criteria for the selection of policy instruments.
Adaptation measure Challenge Extent to
which
challenge is
present
Criteria at
risk
Performance criteria for the selection of policy instruments
(see Table 2)
Green roofs for rainfall
retention
Uncertainty High Effectiveness Steers toward supplying sufficient levels of adaptation goods/services
Fairness Steers toward supplying sufficient levels of adaptation goods/services for
everyone now and in the future
Legal
certainty
Offers legal certainty through understandable rules
Efficiency Promotes flexible solutions that can be adjusted over time
Spatial
diversity
High Fairness Steers toward supplying sufficient levels of adaptation goods to
vulnerable hotspots
Efficiency Promotes diverse adaptation action tailored to a specific location
Flood-resilient building
measures
Spatial
diversity
High Fairness Steers toward supplying sufficient levels of adaptation goods to
vulnerable hotspots
Efficiency Promotes diverse adaptation action tailored to a specific location
Behavioral adaptation to
extreme heat
Spatial
diversity
High Fairness Steers toward supplying sufficient levels of adaptation goods to
vulnerable hotspots
Efficiency Promotes diverse adaptation action tailored to a specific location
Social
complexity
High Input
legitimacy
Serves all relevant interests that are influenced by the policy without
excluding actors that have something at stake
Accountability Supports the allocation and transparency of responsibilities for
adaptation action for both the governors and the governed
transparency of responsibilities” (Table 5). No single instrument
scores high on all four criteria (Table 3). Contractual agreements
score best on all these criteria. An example of a contractual
agreement is a covenant between local health authorities and civil
society such as advocacy groups for the elderly and community
workers, which stipulates responsibilities for active advice to
elderly people. Contractual agreements, however, score medium
on the criterion of serving all relevant interests. This would imply
that several instruments are needed to cover the diversity of stakes
involved in this socially complex issue. It is, for instance, obvious
that population groups vulnerable to heat stress should be steered
differently than the health practitioners who could keep an eye
on them. Clearly, a requirement that forces a vulnerable individual
to drink an extra glass of water is probably ineffective and would
certainly not be considered legitimate. However, a requirement
for health practitioners and social workers to track and monitor
vulnerable individuals seems less inappropriate. In particular, for
this adaptation measure, a mix of instruments is preferable.
General heat health campaigns can be directed at the whole
population and further targeted with specific information to
vulnerable groups. Contractual agreements can be made between
public health officials, health care institutions, and social/
community workers that make special arrangements for
stimulating active engagement with particular vulnerable groups.
The mix of instruments also implies a mix of governance
arrangements. 
Overall, the results indicate that contractual agreements are an
appropriate policy instrument for the three adaptation measures
in our study (Table 6). This is because the three measures score
high on the governance challenge of spatial diversity. Contractual
agreements permit governors to differentiate among vulnerable
areas, regions, and population groups, and hence, to direct
adaptation actions toward these hotspots. The varieties of
appropriate instrument mixes among these three adaptation
measures, therefore, stem from the differences in the extent of
uncertainty and social complexity.
CONCLUSION AND REFLECTION
We presented a method for the selection of a mix of public and
private policy instruments for promoting climate adaptation
action. So far, the “how to adapt” question has tended to be
dominated by debates on the adaptive capacities required (e.g.,
Eakin and Lemos 2006, Gupta et al. 2010, Juhola and Kruse 2014)
and on overcoming the barriers that constrain action (e.g., Moser
and Ekstrom 2010, Biesbroek 2014). We pose the employment of
policy instruments as an alternative interface between adaptation
planning and practice; the proposed method for their selection
takes into account some of the key barriers and challenges as
discussed in the literature. 
Through the application of the method to three examples of
climate adaptation measures, we arrive at the following four
conclusions. First, the method fosters the assessment of various
types of policy instruments with a comprehensive set of
normative criteria commonly applied in policy practice. The bulk
of the literature on the assessment of environmental policy
instruments focuses on issues of effectiveness and efficiency only
(e.g., Bemelmans-Videc et al. 1998, Bennear and Stavins 2007,
Taylor et al. 2012) or deals with the assessment of one type of
instrument only (e.g., Bennear and Stavins 2007). The few studies
on the evaluation of policy instruments for climate adaptation
tend to emphasize economic instruments and economic criteria
(Hellegers and van Ierland 2003, Fankhauser et al. 2008, Filatova
2014). Furthermore, these normative criteria are specified for
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Table 6. Measure-specific assessment of policy instruments.
 
Adaptation
measure
Dominant
challenge
Relevant indicators to assess
policy instrument
Policy instruments
that score high on
these relevant
criteria
Policy instruments
that score high on
all relevant criteria
Weaknesses of these
instruments: indicators for
which these instruments have
low scores
Uncertainty Steers toward supplying sufficient
levels of adaptation goods/
services
Technical
requirements &
Performance
standards
Performance
standards
Risk of not serving all relevant
interests that are influenced by
the policy without excluding
actors or groups that have
something at stake
Steers toward supplying sufficient
levels of adaptation goods/
services for everyone now and in
the future
Offers legal certainty through
understandable rules
Promotes flexible solutions that
can be adjusted over time
Spatial
diversity
Steers toward supplying sufficient
levels of adaptation goods to
vulnerable hotspots
Contractual
agreements &
Smart subsidies
Risk of not steering toward
supplying sufficient levels of
adaptation goods (for everyone
now and in the future)
Promotes diverse adaptation
action tailored to a specific
location
Green roofs for
rainfall retention
Flood-resilient
building measures
Spatial
diversity
Steers toward supplying sufficient
levels of adaptation goods to
vulnerable hotspots
Contractual
agreements &
Smart subsidies
Contractual
agreements &
Smart subsidies
Risk of not steering toward
supplying sufficient levels of
adaptation goods (for everyone
now and in the future)
Promotes diverse adaptation
action tailored to a specific
location
Behavioral
adaptation to
extreme heat
Spatial
diversity
Steers toward supplying sufficient
levels of adaptation goods to
vulnerable hotspots
Contractual
agreements &
Smart subsidies
Contractual
agreements
Risk of not steering toward
supplying sufficient levels of
adaptation goods (for everyone
now and in the future)
Promotes diverse adaptation
action tailored to a specific
location
Social
complexity
Serves all relevant interests that
are influenced by the policy
without excluding actors that
have something at stake
Contractual
agreements
Supports the allocation and
transparency of responsibilities
for adaptation action for both the
governors and the governed
challenges to the governance of adaptation, namely uncertainty,
spatial diversity, controversy, and social complexity. This
adaptation-specific set of criteria allows for a deliberate rather
than a routine or intuitive choice of instruments for climate
adaptation. 
Second, the step-wise approach of the method enables a
structured and interactive process that fosters dialog and
consensus building among experts, resulting in a deliberative
choice of policy instruments. This resonates with adaptation
scholars, who agree that deliberation and dialog between policy-
makers, scientists, and stakeholders is needed to deal with the
inherent uncertainty and social complexity of climate adaptation
(e.g., Paavola 2008, Adger et al. 2009, Juhola and Westerhoff
2011). 
Third, there is no question of a one-size-fits-all policy instrument
mix for climate adaptation. The examples of adaptation measures
we used show variety in the extent to which the four governance
challenges manifest themselves, resulting in different levels of
appropriateness for different policy instrument mixes. Again, this
seems to fit with the bulk of adaptive capacity/governance
literature, which stresses the need for variety, flexibility, and tailor-
made solutions (e.g., Adger et al. 2009, Saavedra and Budd 2009,
Gupta et al. 2010). 
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Finally, the examples of adaptation measures also show that the
method opens up avenues for launching new policy instrument
mixes. This, in turn, has implications for the division of
responsibilities between public and private actors. A shift in policy
instruments may therefore trigger a shift in governance
arrangements for a certain adaptation issue or measure. 
We end by reflecting on some limitations to our study and, based
on those, suggesting some ideas for future work. The process for
the selection of policy instruments was completed by a group of
six experts representing three scientific disciplines of relevance to
the broad field of policy studies. Repeating our study with more
or other experts, including experts in policy-making and policy
practice, would eliminate potential biases we are unaware of and
increase the robustness of our judgments. Policy-makers may
place different weight on certain performance criteria, in
resonance with the political or social culture to which they are
bound. Instrument choices can also be influenced by
considerations and constraints in the political and societal context
(Hood 1983) or by the attributes of the policy network (Bressers
and O’Toole 1998), phenomena which we did not consider.
Another limitation is the choice of adaptation examples, which
focused on urban adaptation measures. This could bias the set of
criteria employed. Future work could evaluate the
comprehensiveness of the set of criteria by testing it with other
adaptation measures, which might also entail additional policy
instruments. Finally, based on our experience with presenting the
method to a group of policy-makers involved in adaptation
planning for fresh water supply in the Netherlands, we found that
the method was perceived to be quite challenging but also
complex. Therefore, we argue that scientific experts may be needed
to facilitate the process and give structure to the debates. These
experts should have knowledge of the adaptation theme at hand
and should be able to promote the understanding of the
performance criteria and to foster exchange of argumentation
among policy-makers. Ultimately, they can check the validity of
these argumentations to avoid negotiated nonsense (van de Riet
2003).
Responses to this article can be read online at: 
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/issues/responses.
php/6639
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